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Recent Decisions
TORTS -

EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT OF DRAM SHOP ACTS

Defendants in this suit were Illinois tavern owners who, according to plaintiffs' allegations, made certain sales of liquor in Illinois,
and thereby proximately caused plaintiffs' injuries in Michigan. The
causal connection between these geographically remote incidents was
an Illinois citizen who became intoxicated in defendants' tavern and,
thereafter, drove into Michigan, where he negligently collided with
plaintiffs' car. Plaintiffs brought suit in a federal district court in
Illinois under the diversity of citizenship rule. Defendants moved
for judgment on the pleadings, on the ground that plaintiffs had
failed to state a cause of action. The trial court sustained the defendants' motion, and from this adverse judgment plaintiffs appealed, claiming, in the alternative, a violation of (a) the Michigan
Liquor Control Act,1 (b) the Illinois Dram Shop Act,2 or (c) the
common law. On appeal, the plaintiffs obtained a reversal of the
lower court's judgment; the defendants' motion was overruled, and
the case was remanded. 3
Two issues confronted the court on appeal: (1) whether liability
could be predicated upon either the Illinois or Michigan Dram Shop
Act, and (2) if no statutory liability existed, whether the common
law afforded any redress to plaintiffs.
Inasmuch as the acts of defendants, of which plaintiffs complained, occurred in Illinois, whereas plaintiffs' injuries occurred in
Michigan, it was necessary for the appellate court to determine which
state's substantive law should govern. Applying the rule of lex loci
delicti, which dictates that the law to be applied is that of the state
where the "last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged
tort occurs,"' the court stated that the plaintiffs' substantive rights
would be determined under the law of Michigan, the situs of the
injury.
The court briefly discussed the issue of statutory liability. Under
both the Illinois Dram Shop Act and the Michigan Act, a person who
sustains injuries resulting from the drunkenness of another person
may recover for his injuries from any person who contributed to that
drunkenness through the sale of intoxicating beverages. The court
first rejected the Illinois Dram Shop Act because, under Illinois case
1. MIcH. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
2.

5 18.993, .1000 (1957).

ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1957).

3. Waynick v. Chicago's Last Department Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959).
4. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90-94 (3d ed. 1942); RESTATBMBNT, CONFLICT

LAws §§ 377-78 (1934).
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law,5 the Illinois statute may not be applied extraterritorially. 6 The
Michigan statute also was held to be inapplicable because, under
Michigan court interpretations, the statute's effect cannot exceed
Michigan's territorial boundaries. Although bound by the states' interpretations of their own statutes7 to conclude that no statutory liability existed in this case, the court intimated that the ineffectiveness
of the statutes in a case such as this was indeed unsatisfactory. In
the words of the court:
It would seem to follow that the practical consequence of denying
extraterritorial effect to such acts is to leave a vacuum in the law....
[N]ature abhors a vacuum; so does the law .... 8
The court proceeded to consider defendants' liability under the
common law of Michigan. The appellate tribunal began by quoting
from a Michigan decision:
A general principal of the common law [is] that whenever the law
gives a right, or prohibits an injury, it also gives a remedy by
action ... 9
Using this broad, general statement as a major premise, the court,
in almost syllogistic fashion, went on to conclude that there was a
common-law liability in this case. Briefly, the court reasoned as follows: The Illinois Dram Shop Act provides that the sale of liquor
to an intoxicated person is unlawful and punishable by a fine or imprisonment ;1O the purpose of this statute is to protect any member of
the public who might be injured as a result of the intoxication to
which the particular sale of liquor contributes. The court concluded
that since the law prohibited defendants' acts and these acts led to
plaintiffs' injuries, then under the principle previously annunciated,
that whenever the law prohibits an injury it provides a remedy, the
plaintiffs were entitled to redress.
The court buttressed this somewhat tenuous reasoning with a quotation from an annotation in American Law Reports to the effect
that, although ordinarily at common law a vendor of intoxicating liquors is not answerable to a third person for injuries sustained as a
result of that intoxication, there are some exceptions." The authority for this statement consists of two cases,'" both of which involved a
5.
6.
the
the
7.

Eldridge v. Don Beachcomber, Inc., 342 Ill. App. 151, 95 N.E.2d 512 (1950).
This seems to be primarily a reiteration of the rule of lex loci delicti. It would seem that
court need not have considered the extraterritorial effect of the Illinois statute, in view of
court's statement that Michigan law governed the case.
Erie Ry. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Green v. Lessee of Neal, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)

291 (1832).
8. Waynick v. Chicago's Last Department Store, 269 F.2d 322, 324 (7th Cir. 1959).
9. Stout v. Keyes, 2 Doug. 184, 186 (Mich. 1845).
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 43, § 131 (1957).
11. Annot., 130 A.L.R. 357 (1941).
12. Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P.2d 147 (1940); Swanson v. Ball, 67 S.D. 161, 290
N.W.482 (1940).
10.
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wife suing a tavern owner for loss of consortium. In both of these
cases, liability was founded upon an analogy to the modern commonlaw right of recovery for loss of consortium against one who administers habit forming drugs to the plaintiff's spouse. 3 It would seem
that this analogy is inapplicable in the instant case.
The court's reasoning is further weakened by the fact that there
was no discussion of the issue of proximate cause, the lack of which
is the basis for the refusal of most courts to find a common-law liability.14 The court's decision was also somewhat contradictory. On
the one hand, the court refused to grant extraterritorial effect to the
"civil-liability" portion of the Illinois Dram Shop Act. On the other
hand, however, the court, in essence, gave extraterritorial recognition
to the penal portion of the Illinois statute by using the defendant's
violation of this section of the statute as the basis for finding a liability under Michigan common law.
The court undoubtedly achieved a just result in the instant case,
although the result was reached by a circuitous path. The basic problem, however, remains unresolved. The legal vacuity which is created
by the denial of extraterritorial effect to the "Dram Shop" statutes
is undesirable. 5 This is especially true when both the state in which
the injury occurred, and the state in which the defendant's sale occurred, have "Dram Shop" Acts and liability is denied upon what is
no more than a mere technicality. Fortunately, the question of extraterritorial effect is still an open one, in that very few jurisdictions
have decided this issue. Of the four jurisdictions which directly con8 whereas the
sidered the question, two denied extraterritorial effect,'
17
other two jurisdictions reached the opposite result.
Perhaps the courts in the future will be willing to extend the scope
of the "Dram Shop" statutes to meet this problem. But in the absence of statute, it is difficult to see how any liability exists on the
part of the tavern owner. The suitability of the negligence theory in
this case is doubtful, because of the lack of proximate cause. Although it may be socially desirable to hold tavern owners responsible
under the circumstances in this present case, it is not desirable that
courts should achieve this result through judicial legislation.
MICHAEL HONOHAN
13. Hoard v. Peck, 56 Barb. 202 (N.Y. 1866); Holleman v. Harward, 119 N.C. 150, 25
S.E. 972 (1896); Flandermeyer v. Cooper, 85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N.E. 102 (1912).
14. Weller v. Collinsworth, 144 Ky. 3, 137 S.W. 766 (1911); Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis.
66, 288 N.W. 774 (1939). See Belding v. Johnson, 86 Ga. 177, 12 S.E. 304 (1890).
15. For a discussion of the extraterritorial effect of "Dram Shop" Acts, see 1958 U. ILL. L.F.
287.
16. Eldridge v. Don Beachcomber, Inc., 342 Ili. App. 151, 95 N.E.2d 512 (1950); Goodwin

v. Young, 34 Hun. 252 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1884).
17. Osborn v. Borchetta, 20 Conn. Supp. 163, 129 A.2d 238 (1956); Schmidt v. Driscoll
Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957).

